## AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

**Quiet Professionals** 

# OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM LESSONS LEARNED



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## FORCES SUMMARY

**AS OF 1 FEB 03** 

■ MC-130E/H COMBAT TALON I & II

- MC-130P COMBAT SHADOW
- AC-130H/U GUNSHIPS
- MH-53 PAVE LOW HELICOPTER
- EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO
- 720<sup>th</sup> SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP





# MC-130E/H COMBAT TALON I & II





#### **TYPE MISSIONS:**

INFIL / EXFIL, RESUPPLY, AIRDROP, AIRLAND, BLU-82, HAR, PSYOP, HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

#### **SORTIES FLOWN:**

MC-130E 1,718

MC-130H 1,106

### **HOURS FLOWN:**

MC-130E 4,351

MC-130H 5,172



# MC-130P COMBAT SHADOW



### **TYPE MISSIONS:**

HELO AIR REFUELING, SEARCH AND RESCUE, INFIL/ EXFIL, AIRDROP, AIRLAND

**SORTIES FLOWN: 1,082** 

**HOURS FLOWN: 3,481** 



# AC-130H/U GUNSHIPS



### **TYPE MISSIONS:**

CAS, ARMED RECCE, ARMED INTERDICTION, C2 RELAY

SORTIES FLOWN: 1,238

AC-130H: 621

AC-130U: 617

HOURS FLOWN: 8,124

AC-130H 3,093

AC-130U 5,031



# MH-53 PAVE LOW HELICOPTER



### **TYPE MISSIONS:**

INFIL/EXFIL, CSAR

**SORTIES FLOWN: 1,053** 

HOURS FLOWN: 2,431



# EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO



### **TYPE MISSION:**

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BROADCASTS

**SORTIES FLOWN: 373** 

HOURS FLOWN: 2,888



# SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP



#### **TYPE MISSION:**

SR/DA/SSE/UW

#### **AUSTERE AIRFIELD OPS:**

**CONT'L 8,100 SORTIES** 

#### **TERMINAL ATTACK CTRL:**

630 TERMINAL AIR STRIKES

C2 OF UAV'S

2.2 MIL LBS OF BOMBS

#### PERSONNEL RECOVERY:

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS/
INCIDENTS



## C2ISR

- LIMITED C2ISR ASSETS (AWACS, JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, PREDATOR)
   AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT SOF.
  - SOF OPERATIONS NOT FULLY COORDINATED WITH C2ISR ASSETS DUE TO:
    - STOVEPIPED FUNCTIONS
    - OVER CLASSIFICATION
    - ATO REQUIREMENTS FOR SOF GROUND/AIRBORNE ALERTS
  - SOLUTION: FULLY INTEGRATE SOLE IN ALL FUNCTIONS
- SOF LACKED KNOWLEDGE OF CAF C2ISR AND EW CAPABILITIES/ EMPLOYMENT LIMITATIONS
  - SOF'S DESIRE TO BE "CLANDESTINE"
  - LACK OF COORDINATION/COMMUNICATION WITH CFACC
  - SOLUTION: "SPREAD THE WORD" & INTEGRATED SOLE



## **UAV's**

- UAV INTEGRATION GREATLY INCREASED AC-130 EFFECTIVENESS
  - ACQUIRED ABILITY TO INTEGRATE UAV'S INTO TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROL OPERATIONS
- SUCCESS OF TACTICAL UAV'S
  - ROUTE RECON
  - FORCE PROTECTION
  - VIEWING AVENUES OF APPROACH
  - POSITIVE TARGET ID



## INTEGRATION/DECONFLICTION

- AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE DECONFLICTION SYSTEMS (BLUE FORCE TRACKING, SADL, LINK-16)
  - LACK OF TRAINING/EDUCATION AND CONOPS
  - FILTERING OF BFT SIGNALS
  - SOLUTION: GET COP TO THE FIELD; TRAINING AT SOF UNIVERSITY



## **FIRES**

- TARGETS WERE FRAGGED INSIDE KNOWN RESTRICTED FIRE AREAS/NO FIRE AREAS ESTABLISHED IN THE AOC. TARGET DECONFLICTION DEFAULTED TO THE SOLE
- FRATRICIDE
  - C2ISR AND CAF WERE PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON SOF TEAM OPERATIONS/LOCATION – SEVERAL CLOSE CALLS
  - NAVIGATIONAL PROCEDURES/AWARENESS ONE FRATRICIDE INCIDENT
- THERE WAS NO FIRE SUPPORT CELL IN THE CJTF TO DECONFLICT OPERATIONS WITH THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDER
  - SOLUTION: LOCATED AN ACCE WITH CJTF



## SYSTEMS INTEROPERABILITY

- LACK OF COMMONALITY (DATUM AND FORMAT) AMONG THE SERVICES (WGS 72 VS 84)...COORDINATION IMPACTED
  - LED TO DIFFICULITIES IN IDENTIFYING HLZ, DZ, FRIENDLY AND ENEMY TARGET LOCATIONS
- AIR UNITS DID NOT ALWAYS UTILIZE SAME COORDINATE SYSTEM AS GROUND UNITS (LAT/LONG VS. GRID)
  - SOLUTIONS: EXCHANGE OF LNO'S; EDUCATE NEW UNITS AS THEY ARRIVE, CONTINUED JOINT EXERCISES/TRAINING



## **PSYOPS CAMPAIGN**

■ LIMITED FEEDBACK TO COMMANDO SOLO ON QUALITY/PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS OF BROADCAST



## "EXTREME" OPERATIONS

- AIRCRAFT OPERATED ON THE MARGINS
  - HIGH GROSS WEIGHTS/PRESSURE ALTITUDES/ TEMPERATURES
  - HELO A/R OPERATIONS CONDUCTED AT 10,000 FT.
  - LOW LEVEL OPERATIONS 10-15,000 FT.
  - AIRDROP PROFILES (HIGH ALT MASS CDS AIRDROPS)
  - IMPOSING ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES LIKE "TALCUM POWDER" DUST AND "LOW VISIBILITY CONTRAST RIDGELINES"
- SOLUTION: LIMIT THOSE MISSIONS IN THESE ENVIRONMENTS;
   MANAGE RISK OF THOSE MISSIONS THAT ARE "MUST DO"; EDUCATE INCOMING CREWS WITH LESSONS LEARNED; VALUE OF KIRTLAND TRAINING
- AIRCREW LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS ARE INADEQUATE FOR LONG DURATION HIGH ALTITUDE OPERATIONS
- SOLUTION: SHORT TERM: ADDITIONAL CLOTHING

LONG TERM: AIRCRAFT MODIFICATION



# AFSOC SPECIAL TACTICS LESSONS LEARNED

#### SPECIAL TACTICS

- AIRMEN ON THE GROUND GREATLY ENHANCED AIRPOWER EFFECTS
- HANDOFF OF ST AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES DELAYED FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS
- TERMINAL CONTROL IS NOT MERELY CAS BUT MORE ACCURATELY DESCRIBED AS BATTLEFIELD AIR OPERATIONS (BAO)
- TACTICAL UAV'S FORCE MULTIPLIER!



#### FINAL THOUGHTS

- OEF WAS A SPECIAL OPERATIONS WAR
- THERE WERE MANY "LESSONS LEARNED"
- HAVE TAKEN CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- NEXT CONFLICT, DEPENDING ON TIMING, COULD BE FOUGHT BY SAME WARRIORS – WON'T HAVE TO RE-LEARN LESSONS!



## **QUESTIONS/COMMENTS**

